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•  t •. IN.TRODUCTION 
Since  the first oil crisis many  basic  industries  in  the  EEC  have  experienced 
declining markets  but  in  few  has  the  recession been  so  protracted and  severe 
as  in  the  shipbuilding  industry.  Within  this  sector  employment  in . new 
building  ha·s  since  1975  withiri  the  present  enlarged  Community  dropped  by 
more  than  50  % and  capacity  has  been  reduced by  tlose to  50  X~ 
Within  the  Community  during  the  last  decade  Member  States  have  responded  to 
the  crisis by  a  progressive  retreat within  the  sector  from  one  restructuring 
plan  to  another,  involving  increasing  social  and  regional  problems  for 
Member  States,  and  continuous  requests  for  public  support  and  protection, 
which  l)ave  stretched  the  exigences  to  State  budgetary  resources  and  which 
has  at  the  same  time  led  to· a  gr~dual  segregation  of  the  national. markets 
within  the  EEC. 
One  of  the principal  causes  of  this  crisis  has  been  the  large  excess  capa-
city within the  world's  merchant  fleet.  The  surplus,  which  has  been  steadily 
aggravated  by  speculative ordering  unrelated to  the need  of the  market,  is 
today  of  an  .estim~ted order  of  somewhat  150  million dwt,  which  corresponds 
to  6  years  production  of  all  shipyards  in  the  world  at  the  1985-level  of 
production,  and  this at  a .time  when  seaborne  trade  ex~ressed in  tonnes/miles 
is more  than  10  % below  the  Level  of. 1975. 
Another  main  cau~e has  been  the  development  arid  expansion  in  certain third 
couritri~s  of  new  shipbuilding  ca~~cities which  have  proved  extremel~ compe-
titive. 
.  . 
Despite  sighificant  restructuring  efforts . involving  heavy  economic  and 
social  sacrifices the  crisis  has  continued  to deepen.  Unless  remedial  action 
is taken  the  sector  seems  destined to decline stilt further.  Presently, th• 
Level  of  new  orders  has  deteriorated to  a  new  low  which  makes  drastic 
structural  interventions  necessary both  inside the  Community  and  by  its main 
competitors. 
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Given  the  short  and  medium-term  outlook  for  the  market,  it is unrealistic to 
ex~ect any  lessening of the crisis.  Market  forecasts  for  the  coming  10-year 
period  give  no  hope  for  a  better  utilization  rate  of  the  existing  excess 
capacities. 
Faced  with  these  sombre  perspectiv~s  concerted action  at  CommunitY  level  is 
needed  ~f the  sector  is to  survive  in  the  long  term. 
Since  shipbuilding  will  continue  in  most  yards  only  if  supported  b~  public 
finance  the  future  aid  strategy  is  the  key  element  in  the  survival· of  the 
sector. 
Only  by  gearing  the  Community. policy  towards  reinforcing the  competitiveness 
of its  ~hipbuilding industry  on  the areas,  where  it remains  relatively most 
competitive,  i.e.  on  high  technology  ships  and  vessels  on  ·which  it  has 
developed a  lead as  to know-how,  can  a  healthy and  effective  core  of activi-
ties  be  ensured,  on  which  the  future  existence of the  sector  can  be  based. 
Concentration  on  high  technology  shipbuilding  activities  ~ill  provide  Com-· 
munity  shipyards·  with  a  sound  foundation  on  which  to  follow  any·  future 
trends  of  the market. 
• .  i 
- 3  -
II.  AID  STRATEGY  FOR  COMMUNITY  SHIPBUILDING  AFTER  1986 
1.  Si~ce 1981  aid  to the  shipbuilding sector  has  been  governed  by  the  Fifth 
Directive which  expires  at  the end  of  1986.  The  Directive  has  set out  the 
terms  and  conditions  under  which  the  Commission  has  been  able  to 
.  . 
authorise  subst~ntial volumes  ~f state aid to the  shipbuilding industry. 
By  linking  the  Commission's  approval  of  these  aids  to  strict,  specific 
. conditions  relating to  restructuring measures  to  be  undertaken  by  the  aid 
beneficiaries,  progress  has  been  made  in  the  structur~l adaptation of  the 
Community's  shipbuilding  industry during  the  period  involved. 
The  aid  rules  l<Jjid  down  in  the  Fifth  Directive  have,  however  suffered 
from  certain  shortcomings.  They  have  not  been  able  to  ensure  full  aid 
transparency  because  they  do  not  place  all  kinds  of. assistance  to ship-
yards  on  an  equal  footing  throughout  the  Community. 
Moreover,  together  with  a.general  incr~ase  in  state  aids  throughout  the 
Community,  national  policies  in  ~esponse to the  shipbuilding  and  shipping 
.crises  have  resulted  in ~n increased  segregation· of the  national  markets 
lr.'ittiin  the  EEC  which  has  seen  intra-Community  deliveri.es  drop  from  more 
.  . 
tha~ 20  X in y•ars  of  low  aid  intensity  (1973-1975)  to  below  5  X during 
·  the  period  of  the  Fifth  Directive  (see  Annex  1, P•  13). 
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2.  The  world  crisis  in  shipbuilding  continues  to deepen. 
Tlie  important  grants  and  credit  facilities  accorded  to  shipowners  have 
larg~Ly  red~ced the  clients'  own  investment  risk  and  have  thus  led  to an 
increase  in  tonnage  which  largely  exceeds  a  market  need  which  has  been 
declining due  to  a  continuing trend  towards  less  bulky  cargo  over  shorter· 
distances  in  the· world's  seaborne  trade. · 
The  volume  of  world-wide  shipbuilding overcapacity is generally·.estimated 
around  30  %,  this  in spite  of  the  extensive  structural  adaptations  car-. 
ri  ed  out  during  the  last  10  years.  In  the  enlarged  EC  capacities  have 
been  almost  halved  from  approximately  6.6 million  cgt  in  1975  to 
ap~roximately 3.5 million  cgt  at  present. 
Together  with  the  overcapacity  of  operational  tonnage  on  the  shipping 
market  the  fier·ce  price  competition  for  new  building· has  negatively 
affected freight  rates.  The  civercapacity  situation for  shipbuilding has 
caused  prices  to  slump  to  a  level  where· often  they  harqly  make  any 
contributiori to  fixed  costs  in  West  European  shipyards.  This  in  turn has 
had  an  adverse  affect  on  shipbuilding prices. 
The  price problem  has  been  accentuated  by  the  fact  that  a  major  share  of 
the  new  capacity  brought  on-stream  over  the  last  ten  years  in  the  Far 
East  is  extremely  cost  competitive.  Differences  in the  cost  structure  in 
favour  of  these  Far  Eastern  price  leaders  compared  to  European  yards  can 
be  up  to  SO  %  for  standardized  vessels  in  series,  . which  explains  the 
drlimatic  fall  in prices  for  certain types  of  ships. 
3.  Sinc.e  the  end  of  1984  the  structural  crisis  in  this  sector  has  been 
aggravated  by  a  cyclical  "crisis  within  a  crisis".  Forecasts  of  yearly 
aver•ge  newbuilding  demand  h~ve recently been  made  by  the  Associ~tion of. 
West  European  Shipbuilders  CAWES)  and  the  Shipbuilders  ·Association  of 
Japan  ·CSAJ).  They  came  to  a  re~~rkably similar  con~lusion 
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(million .cgt) 
1984-1990 
1990-1995 
AWES· 
12.7 
18.5 
SAJ 
13.3. 
19.0 
These  have  to  be  compared  with  a  1985  world  output  of  13.7  mill  ion  cgt 
Cof  these  approx.  16.5% or  2,3 million  cgt  fall  withiri EEC  12).  Ho~ever, 
this +/- 13  million  cgt  for  1984-90  is  the  average  of  a  slump  in  produc-· 
tion  of  around  11  million  cgt  for  1987-88  <already  initiated  by  a  level 
oJ  new  orders  of  10,3 million  cgt  in  1985)  and  a  possible  resumption  in 
annual  demand  of  around  15  million  cgt  at  the  e~d  of  the  present  decade. 
However,·  on  the  basis  of  the  information  presently available to the  Com-
mission,  it  is  doubtful  when  and  whether  any  such  resumption  will  take 
place~ 
Due  to  the differences  in  cost  structure between  West  European  yards  and 
the  Far  Eastern  price  leaders  for  the  most  common  types  of  ships,  any 
improvement  in market  prices  due  'to  a  rise  in  demand  or  to a  reduction of 
the  excess  capacities will  immediately  initiate  an  expansion  of  capacity 
in  the  latter countries,  which  will  find  this profitable  Lon~ before the 
prices  have  reached  a  level  sufficient  to  cover  the  operating  costs  of 
European  yards. 
4.  The  expiry  of the  Fifth  Directive  at  the  end  of  this  year  provides  an 
opportunity to  look  in detail  at  the  future  of  the  industry and  to  decide 
how  best  to  improve  its possibilities of  restoring its  co~petitiveness in 
the  long  term. 
Ttie  last  extension  of  the  Fifth  Directive  assumed  some  recovery. in. the 
market  by  1987.  This  uptur~  h~i ~ot occufed,  and  in fact,  th~ situatiori 
has  even  further  deteriorated.  It  i~  cl•ar that  the  se~to~ is suffering 
from  a  fundamental  structural  crisis  rather  than  a  cyclical  problem  of 
demand.  Market  prospects  remain ..  bleak  and  it  would  be  shortsighted  to 
continue  to  respond  to  the  aggravation  of  the  crisis  by  multiplying .the 
volume  of  operating  aids.  Such  an  approach  would  not  seem  the  most 
appropriate  way  to use  the  increasingly  ~carce budgetary  means  of  Member 
States.  It  would  furthermore  tend  to  increase  the  segregati'on  of  the 
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national  markets  and  jeopardize  the  existence  of enterprises,  which  have 
already  taken  or  ere  presently going  through  extensive  painful  restruct-
uring  measures  in  order  to  adapt  to the  realities of  the  market. 
The  Commission  recognizes,  however,  that  state  aid will  continue to  be 
necessary  in  order  to  encourage  restructuring  in  many  yards  and  in  view 
of  the  cost  differences  which·  exist  for  most  categories ·of  ships  in 
comparisqn  to  Far  Eastern  competitors. 
The  Commissi~n  now  proposes  a  tighter  and  more  selective  aid  policy, 
which  supports  the  trend  of  shifting  production  away  from  relatively 
unsophisticated  ships  such  as  crude  oil  tankers  and  bulk  carriers  toward 
more  technologically  advanced  ships  for  which  the  EEC  cost  disadvantage 
is  r~latively  lower,  and  which  establishes  fair  uniform  conditions  for 
intra  Community  competition.  This  constitutes·the  most  appropriate  and 
positive  approach  to  ensure  in  the  long  term  the  maintenance  of  a  suffi-
cient  level  of activities  in  European  shipyards  and  thereby  the  survival 
of  an  efficient  and  competitive  E~rope~n shipbulding  industry~ 
s~  This  future  aid  strategy  to  be  pursued  by  the  Commission  is based  on  the 
following  main  coAsiderations  : 
- the  present  depressed  state of  the  market  and  its future  prospects; 
- the  need  to  provide  a  suitable  instrument  for  achieving  Community 
objectives  leading  to  the  development  of  a  common  market  and  ensuring 
t~at  intra-Community  competition  is  carried out  on  equal  t~~ms for  all 
Community  operati~ns;· 
the  need. to intensify  s~~uctural change  which  can,  in  th~  longer  term, 
lead  to  a  healthy.  and  ·competitive·  shipbuilding  industry  ~n  the 
.  Community; 
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- the  need  to  take  into  account  the  social  and  regional  problems. 
6~  These  cqnsiderations  lead  the  Commission  to  propose  a . differentiated 
approach  to  the  two  basic  types  of  aid  ;  production  aid  and  aid  for 
restructuring. 
A.  Production  aid 
Given  the  prevailing  and  foreseeable  trends  in  world  stiipbui lding 
together with  budgetary  constraints  within  Member  States  there  is an 
increasing  tendency  to  ques~ion  the  justification  for  continued 
expenditure  of  scarce state  resources  in certain sectors  of  the  ship-
building  industry  where  ~o  cost-related  return  in  the  form  of 
restored competitiveness  can  be  expected  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
A key. element  of  the  proposal  is  a  reduced  level  of  production  aid 
which  is  geared  to  meet  competition . in  the  areas  of  shipbuiLding 
where,  compared  to  the  Far  Eastern  yards,  the  Community's ·competitive 
disadvantage  is  lowest,  arid  where  there  is  a  real  possibility  of 
restoring  long  term  competitiveness  Ceg.  in  areas  where  EC  yards  have 
acquired  particular  know-how  through  specialisation  such  as  highly 
sophisticated,  technological  vessels, 
cruise .liners). 
together  with  ferries  and 
In  order  to  improve  the  overall  competitiveness  and  to  develop  an 
undistorted  common  market  in  shipbuilding  by  reversing  the  recent 
trend  toward  segregation  of  national  markets,  this  reduced  level  of 
production  aid  should  be  attained  by  means  of  a  common  uniform 
maximum  ceiling,  based  on  compensation  for  the  cost  disadvantages  of 
the  most  efficient  European  yards  compared  to the  price of  the  most 
competitive  Far  Eastern. price  Leaders  in  the  categori~s of ships for 
which  the  European  yards  are  relatively more  com~etitive. 
The  criteria  for  fixing  arid  applying  the  common  maximum  ceiling  for 
prodGction  aid wi(L  be  the  following  : 
·, 
\ 
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i)  it will  be  fixed  by  the  Commission  after  consul~ation with  Member 
States; 
ii)  the  base  for  the  fixing  of  the  ceiling  will  be  a  study  by  an 
independent  shipbuilding  consultancy  appraising  for  the  various 
categories  of  ships  the  relati.ve  cost  position  of  the  mos:t 
effective  Community  yards  compared  to  the  Far  Eastern  price 
leaders,  hereby  taking  into  consideration  the  price  level  and 
sales  eonditions  practised by  the latter; 
iii)  in  fixing  the  ceiling  due  . consideration  will  be  given  to  the 
expected  long  term  consequences  for  shipbuilding  activity  main-:' 
tainable  in  the  EEC,  aimed  both at  ensuring  the  optimal  act{vity 
level  justifiable  on  economic  grounds  and  at  urging  the  struc-
tural  adjust~ent; 
iv)  The  comparative  cost  equation· and  the  prevailing  market  price 
level  will  be  continuously  monitored  by  the  Commission,  and  if 
there  is  a  significant  change  in  one  of the variables  the  ceiling 
will  be  adjusted  according~y- again  after  consultation  with 
Member  States  at  a  multilateral  meeting,  chaired  by  the 
Commission. 
v>  Only  the  basic  criteria  for  establishing  the  ceiling,  not  its 
concrete nominal  level,  will  be  stipul~ted in the  aid  Directive. 
Nevertheless,  the  Member  States  ~ill be  informed  of  the  level  of 
the. ceiling  by  the  Commission  before  adopting  their  position  on 
the  Directive.· 
vi>  The  proposed  system  will  not  exclude  the  granting  of  p~oduction 
aid  for  any  specific type  of Nessel,  although  in  fixing  the maxi-
mum  cei·ling  for  production  aid  the  Commission  will  be  guided  by 
the  Community's  relative  level  of  competitive  disadvantage  in the 
construction of  different  type  of vessels.  Below  the  aid  ceil1ng 
it will  be  for  ~ember states  to decide  on  the  precise allocation 
of aid. 
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·vii)  It is  imperative  in  order  to .avoid  discrimination,  to  make  all 
forms  of  production  aid. subject  to  the  aid  ceiling,  including 
loss  compensation  and  ·such  aid  ~hich  is  granted  indi~ectly 
through  third persons. 
Full  transparancy  as  to  su~h aids  and  their  de  facto  application 
must  therefore he  ensured. 
This  implies e.g.  that· the grant  equivalent  of  financing  facili-
ties and  tax  concessions granted to  shipowners  for  investments  in 
ships  will  be  included,  even  if  de  jure  not  linked  to  national 
yards,  if the benefit  accrues  mainly  to  national  yards. 
viii)  Loss  compensation  for  trading  losses  will  also  be  included within 
the  ceiling.  The  burden  of  proof  that  trading  losses  are  not 
concerned  is  incumbent .on  the  aid  ben~ficiary.  Due  to  the diffi-
culties  of  allocating  loss  compensation  .to  individual  ship-
building  contracts  its  aid  intensity  will  be  calculated  as  a 
percentage  of  the  turnover  in  merchant  shipbuilding  of  the  yard 
concerned • 
. ix)  It is  proposed  in  the  initial  stages  to  exclude  from  the  ceiling 
the  aid  element  contained  in  the  standard  OECD  export· credit 
terms~ 
Although  the  granting  of  such  credits  at  terms  below  those  pre-
vailing  at  the  national  market  constitutes an  aid,  the  fact  that 
they  represent  negotiated  general  international  terms  does  by  an 
alignment  strategy  allo~ this aid  element  to be  disregarded with-
in  the  ceiling. 
x)  Some  Member·  States  gr.ant  aid  tci  developing  countries  in. t.he  form 
of  ships;  For  example,  und~r prevailing  OECD  terms  such  ships 
must  contain  a  minimum  "gift"  element  of  25  ·%.  Such  aid  should 
not  be  included  under  the  aid  ceiling  but  it will  be  necess~ry to 
ensure  strict  control.  of  compliance  with  the  OECD.  c.riteria 
through  obligatofy  ~rior notificatioh of  such  cases. 
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xi)  As.  the  production  aid  ceiling  represents  ari  alignment  with. the 
most  efficient jards to  Far  Eastern  prices  its application  is not 
conditional  on  restructuring  measures.  It should,  however,  in 
itself constitute a  built-in incentive for  lesi competitive  yards 
to  accelerate  and  intensify  the  structural  a~justments necessary 
in order  to maintain  a  ~ufficient  level  of  activiti~s within  this 
production  support  level. 
B.  Restructuring  aid 
As  all  Member  States  should  have  equal  opportunities  to  compete  at 
the  reduced  level  of  production  aid  the  Commission  will  consider 
aids  necessary to carry  through  the  desired  structural  changes,  i.e. 
in  particular  aid  destined  to  cover  the  costs. of  total  or  partial 
closures,  normal  expenditUre  occasioned  by 'total or partial  closures, 
or  investment  costs  connected  to. specialization  and  innovation  or 
research  and  development  costs,  provided that it does  not  lead  to ~n 
increase  in  capacity. 
No  aid  ceiling  will  be  imposed  when  ·aids  serving  the  necessary 
structural  adjustments  enabling  yards  to  operate  under  the  ·new  pro-
duction  aid  ceiling  are  concerned.  In  the  appreciation  of  such  aid 
the  Commission  will  be  guided  by  the  common  interest  in  having  a 
viable  shipbuilding  industry,  taking  into  account  the  persistent 
structural disparities of  yards  in  the  different  Member  States. 
Restructuring  aid  will. be  monitored  closely  to  ensure  that  it  is 
limited to  covering  normal  expenditure  related  to  structural  adjust-
ment  .which  is  both  genuine  and  i:-reversible.  In  cooperation  with 
technical  experts  the  Com~ission will  endeavour  to establish a  yaid-
stick for  measuring  capacity  reductions. 
The  Commission  is  conscious  of  the  social  and  regional  consequences 
·which  are  likely to  result  from  these structural  changes;  see  in  that 
context  the  follbwing  two  chapters. 
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7.  It  is  proposed  to  treat  ship  conversion  in  the'same  way  as  shipbuilding. 
On  the other  hand,  the  Commission  does  not  envisage  allowing  for  aid  for 
~h1,f)repair  except  for  total  and  partial  closures,  ·in  Line  with  the 
present  provisions  of the  Fifth  Directive.  There  is  currently  a  ~onsider­
able  overcapacity  in  this  sector  and  a  further  concentration  here  is 
likely as  a  result of  the  new  aid  strategy for  shipbuilding. 
The  aid  polity must  be  geared  towards  avoiding  the maintenance  of  conti-
nued  overcapacity·by production  aid  and  towards  supporting  the  necessarj 
structural  adjustment  through  aid  for  this  pu~pose. 
8.  Full  aid  transparency is a  vital element  in  assuring the  proper  function-
ing  of  a  Community  aid  system  both  in  respect  of  operational  aids  and 
burden- sharing  with  regard  to  restructuring ·efforts.  Consequently  the 
Commission·  will  strengthen  the  notification  rules,  and  also  the  a· 
posteriori  reporting  obligations  of  Member  States  as  regards  actual  aid 
payments,  and  the  achievement  of  restructuring objectives. 
9.  Home  credit schemes  are  operated  in  c~rtain Member  States.  T~e Commission 
has  taken  note  of  the  reticence  expressed  by  the  majority  of  Member 
States  on  the possible  introducti~n of  a  Community  Home  Credit  Scheme  as 
the  sole  form  of  production  aid  for  Community  shipbuilding.  It  does  not 
therefore  intend  to  pursue  this matter  at  the present  time. 
10.  In  order  to  allow  for  the  proposed  aid  strategy  to  produce  a  structural 
effect  in the  sector,  it  is  proposed  that  the  new  aid  rules  apply  for  a 
5-year  period  until  the  end  of  1991. 
However,  the  Commission  reserves  the  right,  if  necessary,  to  make· 
proposals  for  an  adaptation. of  the  scheme.  After  two  years  of  operation 
of  the  new  scheme  it will  report  to :the  Cou·ncil. 
1~.  In  Spain  and  Portugal  the  restructuring  process  is  less advanced  than  in 
other  Member  States  and  the  immediate  application  of  the  prripo$ed  maximum 
obligatory production  aid  ceili~g may  caus~ spectal difficulties  in these 
countries. 
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It  is  proposed  to  allow  these  two  new  Member  States  a  certain  trans-
itional  period,  during  which  through  intensified  and  accelerated 
restructuring they  may  become  able  to  conform  with  the  new  rules. 
During  this  transitional  period,  which  should  be  shorter  than  the  vali-
dity of  the  new  regime,  it would  seem  reasonable  to a·pply  the  current  aid 
rules  with  the  emphasis  on  the  following  conditions  : 
- a  clear degressivity  in  production aid  during  the transiti6nal period; 
- the  adoption  of  restructuring  plans,  which  after  the  end  of  the 
transitional  period  will  make  them  cap~ble of  operating  under  the  new 
aid  rules. 
12.  The  Commission  will  present  to  the  Council  a  detailed proposal  for  a  new 
aid  regi~e in the  autumn  1986. 
III.  THE  CO~S~QUENCES OF  THE  PROPOSED  AID  STRAT~GY 
1.  Industrial  Consequences 
1~1.  A-trend  towards shifting the  West  European  shipbuilding output  towards 
non-standardized  ships  with  high-added  value  is already  very distinct, 
see  the  AWES  figures  in  the  attached  statistic  on  development  of 
merchant  shipbuilding  by  region  and  type  of  ship 1978-1985  in  1000  cgt 
and  X <Annex  2). 
This  trend  inevitably  leads  to  a  certain  reduction  in  shipbuilding 
activities within  the  EEC,  less,  however,  measured  in  construction 
value than in  construction  volume. 
The  proposed  uniform  aid·  ceiling  for  production.  aid  will  ensure  that 
this structural  adjustment  takes  place  in  an  orderly  way  which  in  the 
long  term  renders  maximum  advantage  to  the  Community. 
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1.2.  The  proposed  aid  policy  will  have  an  optimal. effe.ct  on  competitive-
ness,  if the  Member  States use  their  aid  to  strengthen  or  maintain the 
position of  the  most  competitive yards,  rather .than  trying  to  spread 
the  cuts out  evenly  across  the  board.  It  is  important  for  a  yard  not· 
to  fall  belo~  ~ certain critical  level  of  capacity  and  output,  beyond 
which  it  begins  to  lose  its  ability  to  innovate,  technological 
diversity  and  versatility. 
The  yards,  too,  will  have  every  interest  in  using  the  aid available 
f~r. innovative  designs  within  a  more  selective  range· of  ship types. 
1.3.  The  competitiveness  of  European  yards  relative  to  their  Asian  rivals· 
increases  through  the  15  ship  types  in  the  OECD  classification,  as 
these  become  more  ~echnically sophisticated and  non-standardized,  and 
Community  yards  are  able  to  compensate  for  their. cost  disadvantages 
with  greater  know-hbw  and  expertence. 
For  la~ge oil tankers  and  bulk  carriers  Community.  yards  are  so  uncom-
petitive that-their position  is  scarcely worth  defending. 
They  are  better  placed  for  ships  - and  this  even  applies  to  tankers 
and  bulk  ca~riers- fitted  with  cargo-handling  facilities  or  designed 
for  special  kinds  of  carg~ :  e.g.  bulk  carriers fitted with  their own 
handling· facilities  for  serving  ports  without  proper  infrastructure,. 
ships  for  transporting  cargos  requiring  special  conditions  (product 
carriers,  LNG  carriers,  LPG  carriers,  reef~rs,  chemical  carriers)  or 
vessels  of  recent  and  innovative  'design  CRo-Ro  vessels,  container 
ships). 
Because  of  its  know~how  ~nd  experience,  espec~ally  in  finishing  and 
special  equipment,  the  Community  is even  better placed  for  non-cargo 
ships,  such as  pass~nger  li~ers and  ferries. 
Finally,  geographical  proximity  a~d tlose  links between  shipyards  ~nd 
owners  will  play  a  role  with  the  smaller,  less  ~xpensi~e  vessels  o~ 
those  used  ove~ a  more  limited  geographical  area  (fishing  ~essels and· 
other  non-cargo  ships· such  as  tugs,  dredgers,  etc ••• ).  Close·  links 
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with  the  owners  clearly  favour  Asian  yards  for  car  carriers,  as  that 
is  where  the  main  car  exporters  are,  and  in  fact  Asian  goods  have  a 
vfrtual  monopoly  of  car  carriers.  However,  such  links  can  also operate 
to the  advantage  of  yards  in  the  importing  countries,  as  is  the  case 
with  LNG  carriers which  the  LNG  purchaser  often negotiates  to  be  built 
by  yards  in  his  country. 
·1.4.  The  conclusions  as  to  the  types  of  vessels  for  which  the  Community 
industry's  position  is  or  is  not  worth  depending  are  not universally 
true or  unchanging  : 
- The  classification  is  necessarily  crude  and  does  not  reflect  the 
varying  degrees  of  sophistication possible within  the  same  category, 
which  can  differ by  a  factor  of  two  or  more.  This  is especially true 
of  the general  cargo  category.  There  is a  constant  demand  for  ships 
to meet  special  requirements. 
- A technological  lead  sometimes  rests  on  identification  of  a  need, 
and  may  be  short-lived if the  technology  used  in building  the  vessel 
is  easily  transferable  or  standardizable.  For  example,  container 
ships  are  now  standardized,  the  cgt  coefficient  for  LNG  carriers has 
fallen  from  over  4  to 1.25  in  the  space  of  a  few  years,  and  this  is 
starting to  apply to  Ro-Ro  vessels  and  reefers. 
Fluctuations  in  demand  and  hence  prices  sometimes  allow  the  Commu-
nity industry  to win  orders  for  which  it  is usually  not  competitive 
enough  (e.g.,  the  comparative  surge  in  demand  for  bulk  carriers  in 
1983-84). 
- Conversely,  the  sectors  ~here Community  yards  appear  strongest  are 
not  immune  to  attack  from  our  .Asian  competitors;  for  example, 
Japanese  yards,  and  recently  Korean  o~es  ~oo,  have  won  orders for 
.ferries and  pas~enger' ships. 
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However,·  broadly  speaking it is  safe  to  say  that  a  ceiling on  produc~ 
tion  aid of  around  the  average  differ~nce between  the  pric~s  Ciriclud-
ing  credit  facilities)  Community  and  Asian  yards  are  able  to ·offer  on 
different  types  of  vessels  would  mean  the  following  for  Community 
yards  : 
- a  very  substantial  reduction  in  the  production  of  unsophisticated 
and  largely  standardized  vessels  (bulk  carr.iers  and  tankers);  in 
1985  these ~ad~ up  14.2 % of  th~ Commi.Jriity  industry's  output  but  had 
already  fallen  to  only  8. 7  % of  new  orders.  It  should  be  stressed 
that  technologically  a  withdrawal  from  this  segment  would  not  be 
irreversible  :  by  maintaining  a  Lead  in  more  sophisticated techno-
logy  it would  be  comparatively easy  to  rea~tivate  Less  sophisticated 
technologies  when  the  market  permitted or  conditions  required; 
- maintenan~e or  strenqthening  of  Community  yards'  position  in  sectors 
in  which  they  have  Little or  no  competitive  disadvantage  :. ferries, 
passenger  ships,  fishing  vessels,  other  non-cargo  vessels.  This 
segment  _accounted  for  26.3  % of  Community  butput  in  1985  but  38.~% 
of its order  intake; 
- in  the  intermediate  categories  (general  cargo  ships,·  reefers,  Ro-Ro 
vessels,  chemical  carriers,  contain~r ships,  LPG  and  LNG  carrier~), 
which  accounted  for  59.5  %  of  Community  output  and  52.3 %  of  new 
orders  in 1985  and  in which  the  Community  industry,  although  under  a 
definite  cost  disadvantage,  still  has  a  position  worth  defending,. 
w~ether the  Community  manages  to  hold  on  to  its  pr~sent market  share 
or  to  retrench  to  a  smaller-scale,  but  competitively  more  stable 
~osition will  mainly  depend  on  : 
•  the  yards'  strategies  for  innovation  in  de~i~n and  i~provem~nts in 
production  processes, 
the· cooperation  between  yards  and  equipment  suppliers  to  promote 
and  utilize  technological  advances  and  standardization  in 
equipment, 
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•  the  help  the  public  authorities  are  able  to  g.ive  to  stimulate 
these  trends.; 
·Yards  would  in  any  case  remain  free ·to  choose  their  own  product  mix, 
provided  their  aid  requirements  did  not  exceed  the  ceiling  for  pro-
duct ion  aid  set  by  the  Commission.  Within  its  chosen  product  mix,  a 
. yard .  would  even  be  able  to  continue  producing  some  bulk  carriers  or 
tankers,  provided  it was  able  to  make  up  for  the  losses  on  these from 
its building of  other  more  profitable ships. 
2.  International  Consequences · 
The  Commission  is  conscious  of  the  importance  which  must  be  attached to 
t~e particular international  dimension  of this sector. 
Present  worldwide  overcapacity  remains  considerable  and  only  by  a  common 
burden-sharing  by  the  necessary  structural  adaptations  will  it  be  pos-
sible  to  halt  the  price  slump  and  to  arrive  at  a  normal  market  situa-
tion,  where  the  sector  can  exist  without  aid  support. 
In  order to  re-inforce  its international  negotiating power  the  Community 
will  have  to  convince  third  countries  that  the  Community  is. willing to 
improve  competitiveness  and  efficiency  inside  its  own  market.  An  aid 
policy  which· aims  at  providing  undifferentiated  support  regardless  of 
market  developments  hardly  seems  an  appropriate  basis  for  negotiation. 
On  the other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  production aid  ceiling is flexible 
and  directly  linked  to  the  market  behaviour  of  Far  Eastern price  leaders 
provides  the  Commission  with  a  useful  bargaining  base  for  its  negotia-
tions  on  capacity  reductions  with  these  countries.  Moreover,  the  inten-
sified  structural  adjustments  which  are  part  of  the  new  aid  strategy 
will  re-inforce  the  strength  and  credibility  of  the  Commission  as  a 
negotiating partner. 
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3.  International  Measures 
The  Commission  will  intensify  its  pressure  at  the  international  level  to 
obtain  from  the  Japanese.  market  leader  and  the .Korean  price  leaders  a  more 
equitable  contribution·to the  structural  contractions  necessary to  reach  a 
better worldwide. equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand. 
It  is  the  Commission•s  intention  alongside  the  efforts  displayed  at  the 
multinational  level  within  Working  Group 6  of  the  OECD  - efforts  which  it 
must  be  allowed  have  ·so  far· only  brought  modest  results  - to  take  the 
offensive  by  pursuing  ad· hoc  bilateral. discussions  at  a  high  level· with 
both  Japan  and  South  Korea. ANNEX  I 
i. SftUA~tci~  AND.  STRUCTURAL  TRENDS  IN  THE  SHIPBUILDING  SECTOR 
1 • 
.  .  1 
Production  and  market  shares 
1.1.  Shipbuilding  in  the  bro~d  sen~e  accounts  for  1.4 X of  industrial· employ-
ment  and  1.1  % of  the  value  added  by  industry.  The  relationship  between 
these  two  indicators  is  in  itself  an  indication  that  value  added  per. 
capita  is  much  lower  in  the  shipbuilding  sector  than  in  industry  as  a 
whole2,  one  of the  reasons  being  that  shipbuilding is heavily  dependent  on 
components  and  materials  supplied. 
1.2.  In  1985  the  shipbuilding  industry  of  the  Community  of  Ten  production 
2 .million  cgt  as  against  5.1  million  cgt  in  1976,  thus  accounting  for 
14.2  of  the  world  total  of  14.1  million  cgt.  This  level  is  the  lowest 
recorded  since the beginning  of  the  crisis and  represents  a  61  % reduction 
since  1976. 
1 
2 
This  decline  has  not  only  affected  Community  producers  it  has  also  hit 
those  in  Japan  and  in  the  rest  of the  world,  although  to.a  lesser extent 
(Japan  down  22.2  %,  the  rest  o.f  the  world  down  36  %) •  By  contrast,  the 
Qnly  major  producer  whose  output  has  increased  regularly  fro~ year  to year 
is South  Ko~ea,  which  has  recorded  a  266  X increase.in  production  since 
1980  <thereby  raising its  share  of  the  world  market  from  3.5  % in  1980  to 
11.5 % in  1985). 
.As  a  general  rule,  tonnages  ~re expressed  in  terms  of  compensated  gross  tonnei 
(cgt).  This  is  not  a  physical  unit  but  simply  a  statistical  unit  which 
reflects  the  volume  of  work  that  goes  into  building  a  vessel. by  multiplying 
the  physical  un1t  (gt  = gross  tonnes)  by  a· coefficient,  which  is  either 
g~eater or· smaller  than  1  according  to the  complexity of the vessel  type. 
It is  not  easy  to place  shipbuilding  in  the strict sense  of  the  word,  that  is 
to  say  the  building  of  new  merchant  ships,  in  perspective  within  the 
Communit>'
1 S  industrial  structure,  since  the  macroeconomic  indic!lltors  relate 
only  to  shipbuilding  in  the  broad  sense  <i.e.  including  repairs,  military 
vessels  and  allied activities). 
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1.3.  Forecasts· for  world  shipbuilding  for  the  coming  years,  according  to· 
figures .supplied  by  the trade associations,  are  as  follows 
1984-90 
AWES  *  12.7 
SAJ  **  13.3 
*  Association of  West  European  Shipbuilders 
~* Shipbuilders  Assoctation  of  Japan 
annual  average  - m cgt 
1990-95 
18.5 
19.0 
According  to  these  estimates,  completions  for  the  period  1984-90  are 
likely to  amount  to  12.7 million  cgt  annually,  i.e.  12  X less  than during 
the  ~revious five  years.  However,  this  average  does  not  reflect  the  slump 
in  the  market  in the  short  term  :  the  AWES  graph  <Table  1)  points -o  a  fall 
to  under  11  million·cgt  in  1987. 
This  is  already  foreshadowed  by  the  new  order  intake. figures  of  only 
10.3 million  cgt  in  1985  and  the  latest  figures  for  the first  quarter of_ 
1986.  The  figures  in  fact  show  a  fall  in  demand  greater  than  was  assumed • 
in  the newbuilding  forecasts. 
1.4.  Worldwide  order  intake  <million  cgt) 
I 
I  1982  1984 
I 
I 
I  14.8  I  11.7 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1985 
10~3 
Last  12  months  I 
(April  1985  - I 
March  1986)  I 
I 
9.7  I 
I  I  I 
-------------------~-----~--------------------------~---------------------~-----------------------
I 
This  steady  fall  in  demand  has  inevitably  affected  the  level  of  order 
books.  At  the  end  of  March  1986  order  books  in the enlarged  Community  were 
estimated  at  around  3.5 mi_llion  cgt.  Annual  production  capacity  in  the 
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Communi~y is  estimated at  3.4 million  cgt,  and  average  annual  pr6ductidn. 
in the t6mmunity  over  the  last three  years  has  been  about  2.~ million  cgt. 
Hence,  current  order books  represent  only one  year's work  if capacity were 
fully  used  and  less  than  on~-and-a-half years'  work  at  fecent  production 
levels. 
In  1987-90  annual  production  is  forecast  to  be  15  million  cgt  worldwide 
and  in  1990-95  18.~ million  cgt. 
Thus,  demand  is only  expected  to  regain  the  pre-1976  levels of  17-20  mil-
L  ion  cgt  in  the  fairly  long  term  and  in  view  of  the  accelerating  and 
intensifying structural  adjustment  in  shipping,  even  these  forecasts  could 
turn  ~ut to be  over-optimistic  and  may  need  to be  revised downwards. 
2.  Capacities ~nd rates  of utilisation 
2.1.  Although  world  output  has  fallen  by  around  36%  since  1976;  world  produc-
tion  capacities  have  not  been  reduced  to  the  same  extent.  Since  the  term 
production  capacity  can  be  defined  in  a  variety of  ways,  the  figures  vary 
according  to  their  respective  sources.  Nevertheless,  all  the statistics 
point  strongly  to  the  existence  of  substantial  surplus  capacity  in  the 
world;  in  spite  of  the  efforts  deployed  by  most  shipbuilders  to  reduce 
capacity in  response  to  the  steadily falling  world  demand. 
It  would  appear,·  on  the  basis  of  the  various  estimates  available3,  that 
world  production  capacity  was  reduced  by  around  20%  between  the  beginning 
of  1976  and  1985.  According  to  the  same  figures,  capacity was  cut  by  some 
45  % in the  Community  and  around  37  X in  Japan,  while  capacity  in  Eastern 
Europe  remained  stable;  in  South  Korea,  Taiwan  and  the  Peopl~'s Republic 
of.thi~a, oh  the  other  hand,  .ca~acity  h~s  increased  considerably. 
3  OECD;  AWES;  Institute of  Shipping  Economies  and  Logistics,  Bremen 
••• /4 .  ANNEX  I 
- 4  -
Also  within  the  Community  the  d~gree of  capacity-reduction  has  varied· 
from  over  50  % in the  U.K.  and  the  Netherlands  to 
between  40  and  50  X in  Germany, 
between  30  and  40  X in  Denmark  and 
30  % or  less  in  France,  Italy and  Belgium. 
2.2.  The  rate  of utilization of  eKisting capacity,  estimated at  around  70% for 
the  Community  as  a  whole,  also  varies  considerably  from  one  Member  State 
to another  : 
70  % or  more  for  Germany,  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands 
around  50  % for  Greece  and  Belgium  ~nd 
around  40  x·  in  Italy,  the  U.K.  and  France. 
2. 3.  The  above  figures  show  that  comparing  the  medium-term  demand  forecasts 
with  p~oduction capacities  in  1985,  the surplus  production  cap~city world-
wide  is  likely to be  around  30%  between  now  and  the  beginnin~ of  the  neKt 
decade,  unless  the  major  shipbuilding countries  substantially reduce  their 
over-capacity. 
3.  Employment 
3.1.  Over  the  last ten years  total  employment  in ·community  shipyards  has  fallen 
by  almost  50  %.  The  reduction  in  Japan  over  the  same  period  has  been  of 
the order of  40  %.  In  South  Korea,  by  contrast,  the  workforce  in the  ship-
building industry is  now  two-and-a-half  times  what  it was  ten years  ago. 
3.2.  The  Member  States  of  the  Community  which  have  suffered  the  most  substan-
tia{  job  losses  are  the  United  Kingdom  <64  X>  and  the  Netherlands  C58  X>; 
the  remaining  countries  have  seen  employment  levels  in  this  sector fall  by 
between  28  % in  the  case  of  Greece  and  52  X in the  case  of  Betgium • 
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3.3.  The  50%  decline  in  the  Community  labour  force  has  affected  the  ship-
.building  industry  as  a  whole  (including  the  building  of  new  vessels, 
off-~hore constructions,  military vessels  and  repairs).  The  t~end in the 
various  naval  activities  over  the  l~st  ten  years  has  beeM  as  follows  : 
-Building of  new  merchant  vessels  - 59% 
- Repairs  - 33% 
- Military vessels.  +  26% 
Consequently,  some  of  the  massive  losses  of  jobs  in  the  building  of  new 
ships  in  the  C6mmunity  have  been  absorbed  in  other  sectors. of  the 
industry,  particularly .military  construction  and  the  off-shore  sector. 
This  phenomenon  is  highlighted by  the  change  in  the  distribution ·of  labour. 
within  the  industry since  the  beginning of 1976. 
1976  1985 
New  merchant  ships  71.3%  57  %· 
Military  construction  4.4%  10.8% 
Ship  repairs  14.3% .  18.6% 
Off-shore  2.1% 
Other  activities  10.0%  11.5% 
3.4.  It should  be  noted. that  the  levels  of  job  losses  and  of  output  in  tonnes 
(not  in  value)  in  the  Community  have  followed  a  vi rtoally  parallel  trend. 
The  increases  in productivity,  which  have  been  effectively achieve,  have 
been  Largely offset  by  law  capacity utilization. 
4.  Pfice~ and  profitability 
4.1.  From  the trends  in  the  prices  tharged  by Japanese  and  Korean  yard~  ~or new 
ship~ over  the  last  ten  years  (jee  Annex  3),  it  is  clear  th~t, apart  from. 
.  . 
a  short-lived  upturn  in  1980-81,  prices  fbr  most  types  of  ships  (except 
for .·medium-size  oil  tankers· and  . bulk  carriers)  have  continued  to  fall, 
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dropping  back  to their 1976  levels  in  1984  and  falling even  lower  in  1985. 
between  1980  and  1985,  prices  quoted  both  in  us  dollars  and .in  yen  have 
fallen  by  more  than  50  X in  certain  cases. 
4~2.  It  is  plain that  the  cost  of  shipbuilding  has  risen  considerably over  the 
last  ten  years.  One  need  only  look  at  trends  in  steel  price~  and  labour 
costs,  which  alone  account  for  at  least  half  of  the  cost  of  a  ship, 
between  1980  and  1985. 
4.3.  A  fall  in  price  of  this  magnitude,  notwithstanding  continually  rising 
costs,  means  ma~girial or  even  negative  Levels  of profitability even  in the 
most  competitive  shipyards  and  has  led  to  renewed  calls  for  increases  in 
government  subsidies. 
In  Japan  the  number  of  Loss-making  yards  is  increasing;  in  Europe  a  yard 
that  makes  a  profit  has  become  the  exception  in  the  present  inarket 
situation. 
5.  Types  of  production 
5.1.  As  a  result  of  the  decline  in  world  prices  for  vessels  over  the  last  ten. 
years,  Community·  producers  have  become  considerably  less  6om~etitive 
internationally for  certain categories of  ships. 
Grouping  ships  into three  major  categories,  the situation is  as  follows 
ior oil  tankers  and  bulk  carriers,  cbsts  in  the  Communit~  are  approxi-
mately  50  % higher  than  world  prices set  by  the  Asian  yards •. The  Commu-
. nity's share  of  world deliveries has  fallen  to  the  point  where  Cat  less 
than  8  %)  it can  be  consid~red to be  marginal;· 
-.in  the  case  o·f  the  various  types  of  cargo  vessels,  the  difference 
between· costs  in  the  Community  and  word  prices  between  10  at:~d  20  X. 
Thus,  while it may  be  losing  its_cost  competitiveness,  th~ Community  i~ 
nevertheless  holding  its ground  on  the  world  market; 
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- for  non-cargo  carrying vessels,  costs  in  the  Community  do  not  appear  to 
b~  higher  than  those  of  shipbuilders  in  other  countries;  although  th• 
Community  doe~ not  have  a  predominant .market  share  at  pre~~nt, the  share 
it does  have  seems  to  be  safe. 
5.2.  Hence,  the  Far  Eastern  shipyards  enjoy a  definite advantage  over  Comunity 
yards  when  it comes  to  series~produced large  and  medi~m-sized ships.  This 
advantage  is due  <to  a  number  of  factors  such  as  : 
- economies  of  scale,  which  they  enjoy  precisely because  they  are able to 
manufacture  in  larger quantities 
- n•wer  and  more  efficient  yards 
- Low  labour  costs  and  higher  productivity 
- equipment  (e.g.  large  engines)  manufactured  on  the  spot  and  at  more 
competitive prices. 
The  Community  still maintains  some  advantages  and  hence  can  stay  reason-
ably  competitive  in  the  third  category  of  ships,  and  to  some  extent  in  the 
second~ thanks  to  : 
the  higher  level  of  technical  expertise  in  design, 
~inishihg~ 
know-how  and 
- the  smaller  proportion  of  the  total  value  of  the  ship  accounted  for  by 
labour  costs, 
the  importance  of  sophi~ticated equipment  whith,  in the.main,  is still 
Europea·n-made, · 
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-the fact  that  alth6ugh  shipb~ilding is  a  worldwide  activity by  defini-
tion,  a  shipowner  may  in  certain  cases e.g.  in the  case of  ships  which 
require  intensive  supervision,  prefer  to  order  from  a  European  yard 
because  of the  geographical  distances  irivolved.  (This  relative advantage 
can  account  for  between  3  and  5% of the  cost). 
5.3.  These  factors  are  reflected  in particular  in  the  fact  that  Community  pro-
duction  expressed  in  terms  of  cgt  (the  unit which  converts  gross· tonnes 
into tonnes  per  hour  of  work)  enjoys  a  much  higher  coefficient4  than  th~ 
other  shipbuilding  countries.  of  the  world,  in  particular  the  Asian 
countries. 
Indeed,  the  degree  of  technical  sophistication  of ships  built  in  Europe, 
which  is also  reflected  in  the  cost  of  components  and  equipment,  is  such 
that  even  though  the  labour  cost  per  tonne  is  higher  in  Europe,  labour 
still accounts  for  a  smaller  share  of the  total  cost  per  completed  tonne. 
As  the  trend  in  the  coefficients  of  the  various  major  producers  shows,  the 
Community  has  continued' to  maintain this qualitative edge  : 
CGT  coefficient 
1976  1980  1985 
Community  0.67  1.37  1.09 
Japan  0.52  0.85  0.68 
Sol!th  Korea  0.42  0.42  0.62 
4  ..  The  higher  the  coefficient,  the  more  sophisticated the  ship 
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this  means  that  the  Community• s  market  shares  are,  increasingly,  far 
smaller  when  expressed  in physical  units  than  when  expressedin  cgt  : 
Commwnity  share  of  world  produ~tibn 
1976 
CGT  23.3 
GT  22.6 
1980 
19.3 
14.0 
1985 
14.0 
10.1 
In  the  case  of  Japan  and  Korea  the  ratio is completely  the  reverse 
CGT 
GT 
Korea 
CGT 
GT 
1976 
37.8% 
46.8% 
1.6% 
2.4% 
1980 
41.2% 
48.2% 
3.5%. 
4.1%  ' 
1985 
45.9% 
52.2% 
11.5% 
14.4% 
The  picture  of  recent  ~nd  future  demand  for  the  main  categories  of ships 
(which  are  given  in  descending  order  of  technical  sophistication  and 
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therefore  in  ascending  order  in  terms  of  the  cgt  coefficient)  is  as . 
. follows  : 
Oil  tankers  and  bulk  carriers 
Cargo  vessels 
Non-cargo  carrying vessels 
1980 
50.7% 
33.3% 
16.0% 
1985 
29.3% 
49.8% 
20.8% 
1984-85(est) 
34  - 36% 
36  - 38% 
27  - 29% 
The  corresponding  breakdown  of  demand  for  Community  product~on  is  as 
follows  : 
Oil  tankers/bulk  carriers 
Cargo  vessels 
Non-cargo  carrying vessels 
.. 
1980 
28.4% 
41.5% 
30.0% 
1985 
8.7% 
52.3% 
38~9% 
Thus,  thanks  to its expertise,.  Community  industry is  reasonably  competi-
tive  in  a  substantial  segment  of  the  market  whic  is substantial  and  will· 
remain  so.  : 
- with  over  60  X  of  the  tonnage  this  segment  accounts  for  a  far  greater 
share  of the world's  production  in value  terms, 
- even  if the  Community's  position  is  ero~-ed - as  it is  likely to  be  - by 
the  progress  of  its  rivals,  there  are  on  the  other  hand  signs  of  a 
relative  re~uction in  the  number  Qf  very  heavy  ships  being series-built 
and  a  te~dericy towards  a  ~reater  measure  of  t~chhical  sophisticatio~ in 
·.certain areas  <e.g.  for  the  transport  of.  re-fined -petroleum  products) • 
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6.  Structural  trends  in  shipb~ilding in  the  Co~munity 
The  structure  of  shipbuilding  in  the  Community  has . undergone  far-reaching 
changes  over  the  last  ten  years,·  which  have  been  prompted  in  particular by 
the  need  to  adapt  the  industry  both  quantitatively. and  qualitatively  to 
market  trends.  The  measures  taken  have  been  in  various.  f~rms  :  · complete 
closures  of  yards,  partial  closures,  conversion of existin·g plant  for  allied 
activities such  as  repairs,  .construction of offshore  structures ormilitary 
vessels,  mothballing  of  part  of  the_ plant  and  equipment,  shedding of  labour, 
centralisation  of  management  of  certain  yards  involving  the ·suppression  of 
some  of  the  amalgamated  firms  or  converting  them  to. other activities. 
Overall,  the  number  of  shipyards  in  t~e Member  States5  fell  from  214  at  the 
beginn.ing  of  1976  t~ 153  at  the  end  of  1985.  Consequently,  the  actual  number 
of  yards  has  fallen  by  29  r..  However,  since. some  of  the  remaining. yards  havE! 
taken  some  plant  out·  of  operation,·  the  reduction  in  capacity  terms· is  as 
indicated  above.  The  pattern  has  differed  from  one  Member  State to.another, 
depending  partly on  the  competitve  situation and  partly on  current policies, 
the  industrial  fabric  specific  to  that  sector  and  on  social  and  regional 
constraints.  The  figures  below  provide  an  idea  of  this trend,,although  they 
are  not  strictly comparable  from  one  Member  State to  anrither. 
Number  of  shipyards  in the  Community 
8  OK  D  F  GR  IRL  I  NL'  UK  ECC10)  s  p 
1975  8  22  45  16  2  1  11  65  ·.44  214  45.  13 
1980  8  21  41  .14  2  1  11  54  29  182  44  13 
1985  8  19  38  14  2  ...  --.·'  to  -.' .  45  . 19  153  31  .  13 
.  , 
5  These  figures  r~fer  only  to  shipyards  ~bove  a  certain  size  which  bu~ld 
primarily  merchant  ve·ssels.  ·Nevertheless,  the  criteria  that  determine  this 
threshold  size  may  vary  from  one  Member  State  to another;  it is assumed  that 
the  shipyards  covered  by  these  figures. represent  at  least  90  X  o.f  national 
··capacity. 
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Number'  of  l~rge  ship~ards 
B  DK  D  F  .GR  IRL  I  NL  UK  . ECC10)  s  p 
'  ..  ~.  l  ..  -. ~ ·•  ..  ~-·:  ~ .'  ;:  ... 
~-· - •" 
1  1  5  5  "'1:  ·- 3  - 4  20  1985 
" "  " 
In  Belgium,  ·two. major  shipyards  were  amalgamated  in  1982, ·: fdllowing  the 
bankruptcy  .of :one  of  them;  this  involved  rationalization  measures  and:  . 
. capacity-shedding  as  well  as.· diversification  of  production.··· A medium-size· . 
shipya~d was  declar~d  bankru~t  in 1984.  The  Belgian  state  has.  a·iinanc~al.  ~ 
stake  in  the  capital of  the  large yard. 
In  Denmark  the  only  major  yard .builds  mainly  medium-sized· vessels.  Of  t·he  . 
medium-sized  yards,  two  have  abandoned  the  constl"uction of  merchant  ships,. 
one  in  1978  and  the  other  in  1983.  The  ·shipyards  in  this  group. build. 
specialized  ships.  A  particular  feature  of  the  Danish  situation  is  the  .. 
.. 
special  relationship  between·thefshipyards  ~nd.the shipowners,  who  own  most' 
of the  shipbui_lding  firms.  ,· 
,.  " 
In  France,  . the  number  of  major_  yards  has  remained  unchanged.  In .1982. they 
were  amalgamated  into two  industr:ial  undertakings  whose  parent  .c~inPIJ.1ies. are 
nationali~ed.  This  operation was  acco~pani~d by·meas~res to  rationalise and 
reduce  capacity  and  conversion  to  other  activities  mainly  connected  .with 
shipping.  Some  small  and  medium .. sized yards  were  amalgamated prior to 1986'; 
t~e  restructuring  operations  carried  out  since.  then  have  been  aimed 
primarily at  reducing  the  capacity of  those  undertakings •. The  Normed  group, 
representing  thre.e  large  yards  and  7,000 employees  has  recently. fHed  for-
bankru~tcy before  the  commercial  court. 
In  Germany,  two  major  yards  have  ceased  shipbuilding activity since  1983;  at 
the  same  time  a  number  of  undertakings  operating  large  yards  were 
amalgamated  in  1983  and  1985.  For  some  of  the  yards  this  involved·. drastic 
reductions  in  capacity  throug~  cqnv~rsion tq: other· activities,  particularLy . 
-~·  .  f:~~- .....  :~.'~"'  :.·  . :.  ·.·~·?·~- ·-~-;- ·.··.{·- :.:  ·.  .  . 
connected with  shipping.  Eight  ·~·mall cJO  inedium~slzed· yards  have  been  closed 
.. 
since  1975.  Generally,  shipyards  are  under  private  own~rship. 
In  Greece,  generally  speaking,  ~hipyards  have  substantially  reduced  ship~ 
building activity.  Ireland's  only  shipyard was  clpsed  in  1984~ 
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In  Italy,  the  building of  civil-ships has  b,en  con-centrated  since  1975  on  a 
IJmjll  number' :of  yards;  the  remaining  yards  have  either beeri  _converted  to the 
building  of  military vessels  or~:-repai r  WOi"k·  or have  been mothb-all~~·  This 
has  apptied- to  targe  and  srriatl  shipyards  ~lik~-~  In  1984  ttl~.  st~te-ownE!d- . 
yards,  which  make  up  a  ~ery  ·t~rge prop~rtion of  this  sector~  -were  amal- ·.• 
gamated;  involving  in  particular  rationalization  measu~es and  centralization· 
of  management. 
In the  Netherlands,  various  m~rgers have  taken  place,  pa~ticularly betwe~n 
the  large  and  medium-sized  ya~ds;  as_a  result  a  number,  iriclud1rig the  ori~y 
large  yard,  have  been  converted. to  shipping-related  activities  other  than 
the  building of  merchant  ships.  Taking all  shipyards  together,  .15  yards  have 
been  closed  and  6  have  stopped  building  ships.  Host  of  the  ow~ership of 
these  yards  is in  priva~e hands.  · 
Iti  the  United  Kingdom  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  shipbui ldi_ng  industry · 
was  nat1'onalised  in  1977  and  since  then  more  than  20  yards  have been  closed;_ . 
some  have  been given  over  to  shipping activities  other than  the building of 
· me·rchant ·ships.  There  have  been  recent  moves  .to  re-privatise. the  under..;. 
taki~gs  carry~ng out  these  activit~es. 
7.  Intra-Community trade 
The  volume  o.f  intra-Community  trade  in  the  shipbuilding  sector  is  very 
small.  The  most strktng  feature  is  ~he drastic  drop  in  intra-Community trade  :. 
that  has  oc·cured. since  the last. ·period  of  low  aid  support  insi.de  the  EEC. 
( 1973-"75) • 
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the  following. table  shows  tn~-- deliveries  of  ships  from  ee¢  )'ards  by· fte~g _. 
·destination in '1973-75  compa_r~d:to the !)eriod of the  Fif-th. d1re.c'ti_y,~_-• 
I 1973  I 
I 
I 
I 
Total  EEC  I  I 
deliveries  .I  6.70  I 
I  I 
Hereof  . I  I 
to national  I ·  I 
markets  I  3.00  I 
to other  EECI  I 
countries  I · 1.44  I 
to third  I  I 
couhtrH!s  I  . 2.26  I 
I  I 
EEC  intra- I  I 
Community  I  I 
_deliveries  out I  I 
of total  I  I 
deliveries  I  21.5%  I 
I  .  I 
Source .:  Lloyds  Register 
1974  I  1975  II 
I  'I  -I  I 
I .  II 
7.36  I  •_7 .61  II 
I  II 
I  II 
I  II 
4.13  I  3.55· II 
I  II 
'1.  35  I.  1.84  II 
. I  II 
1.88  I .  2~22 II 
I  II  I.  II 
I.  II 
I.  II 
·I  II 
18.3%  r 24.2x  II 
I 
'  .;~: 
.  '. 
'  .. 
-II 
1981  I 
I 
I 
I 
2~21  I 
I' 
I 
I 
0.94  I 
I 
0.05  I 
I 
1.22  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2.3%  I 
I> 
. c;n'  mi:ll ion brt)  _,·-._::-
~ .;  ... 
1982  I  1983  ,~ ,984:  I  1.985 
I  r  ,.  I  . I  ..  r-
I  I 
I  ·-I  I 
2.16  I  2~53- t  -_.2.19  1.66  I 
I  I  I  ' .. 
I  I·  I 
.·. ~ 
I  I  . I 
1.23  I  1.41  I  1.46  1.07- I  .. 
I  I  l 
;, 
. '  -.:-.:  ~ 
0.11  I  0.21  I  0.;08  0.06  I 
I  I  I 
0.82  I  0.91  I  0.65- :0.53  I 
~= 
' 
I  I  I  ,. 
I  I  I  I 
I  . I  .  - I  'I  ·:·,,- '"  ... 
I  I  I  .1  . 
',··,  "  -. 
I  I. 
•'  I  -I 
5.1%  I  . 8.3%  'I"  3.7X  I  3.6X  I 
I  :I  I  ·l 
..  , . 
"  ..  .  . '-
..  -·.<-
~ :·J<", 
:·"··· 
.. f"' 
.  '  .. :·····  . 
·.·'·.-: 
·····. 
'1.' '·,{· . 
.  ·,: 
--:<  .. 
.  _ ..... ·.·· 
'  '  ·  ... ··.·  ·'' 
·'  :·:  ~  .•... •  • 
-:." 
. . 
.•( .. 
~Prices at .the  end  o·t:. the  year  fn. US$. mi.ll ion : · 
charged  by  Japanese ·at.d  Korean  lihi pya  refs).·  · ·· 
.  ..  .  ,•  -.  ·~ .. 
... · ..  ·,. 
:·.,_. ___ . 
. .  ~; . 
_.·.:-. 
.·.  _..;, 
. ·,  -; ..  · 
I  ~.  ," 
.  ~.  --~------~~~------------~~~--~~~--~~--~--~~~~·~·~·~~~~~ 
191s1 19781  19791 i98o  1  1981 t  i9s2J,  J.983  .t  . 198.4.  ·  198~.-::. 
: 
I 
I  .... 
30.000  dwt  product  carrier  I  lStOI  lS,.Oj  23,0[  26;01  25,01 ·l70j'1S'OI  '  t  .  <  .. 
87.000  dwt  oil  tanker  I  liS,o.l  20,01  30,01  36,01  4o;ol  25  ~; 91  24 , O'l 
,2i0. 000  dlo(t  oil tanker  I  .·~·,. 38,0!  45,01'  57,01  68,0[  A8 /oL::46i:61 
. 96.000  dwt  oil/bulk/pre carrier  I. 23,.ol  24,0[  35,01  47,0[  44,01  30,0[.  2Bi''OI  . '  '·:'~ 
30.000  d~~o:t  bulk  car·ri er  1~,01  12;0[  15,5[  20,01  19,01  13~01  12';01. 
70.000  dwt  bulk  car.rier  I  16,01  19,0[  26,01  :3o,ol  29,0[  19,01  18~01 
120.000  dwt  bulk  carrier  I  24,01  25,01  33,0[  44,01  42,01  26,0[  25,0]  24,0  20,;: 
125.000  cbm  LNG  carrier  [lOS;  C? IllS, Oll25, 0 [150, 0 [175' 0 [150,0  [1~0.  01.130' 0  ,··--o···o·A 
. ..:i  ',>;'' 
75.000  cbm  LPG  carrier.  I  42,01  45,01  60.·01  75,01 
5.000  dwt  roll-on/roll-off I  io;ol  12,01  14,0[  16,01  ship. , 
J 
·sou.rce  . Fearnleys 
Trend  of  J~panese prices  in Yen: 
(in 
1000  million) 
I 19791  19801  19811 
35.000  dwt  bulk .carrier  I 3' 4./ 
I  I 
4,01  4,71  60.000  dwt  oil  tanker  . I  4,11  6,21  6,41 
. (Source  I  I  I  I  :  Ships tat  B.S.) 
:  ... ·,· 
75,01  53,ol  so,ol  45,0 
20.,01  1S,Oj 12,oi . 10  6 
·.  ' 
4z:~·~·~~ 
.· ;  ~.9._}  P.l:;·~: 
,_, ..  · 
.·  ;  ~ 
19821  19831  19~! 19851  .·· 
I  I  I 
• 3,1 t  4,61  3,31  3,21 
6,21  I  l  3,21 
~--
I  . ·I  I  I 
'··,:-. 
.·.·  ·. 
':"···· 
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...  ·  AsP/act  ..  · 
_:  ·.,,  .. :.· 
.·,-·: 
..... 
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I 
I  I  1983 
l ·  I 
I  .-1· 
I  I 
l  BELGIUM  I  58  700 
I  I 
I  DENMARK  I  428  900 
I  I 
I  FRANCE  I  136 .400 
I  I 
I  F.R~  GERMANY  I  550  400  . 
. I  I. 
IRELA~D  I  .. 
I 
lTALY  I  57  100 
·I 
NETHERLANDS  I  237  300 
I 
UNITE~ KINGDOM  I  150  400 
I. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.  1984 
69  sao· 
405  200 
106500 
L .·  644  soo 
I.  .  I . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
68  200 
. 248.  400 
107  600 
I 
I  .  I  .. 
1985 ·. 
. 26  800 
86  ooo· 
. 262  500. 
819  700 
257  400 
·268  800 
224  400 
. I 
··k .April 85- I·.· 
I ·  Aprfc.s.~  ··  .-1·  .. 
I --·  J  <.  , 
. I .  1i ooo  I  ··<· 
. I.;  --··..  I 
1.  . ,, , • :81  5oo  .·  I . 
I  I 
I  .  193  1oo  I  . 
.  I.  1-··.· 
-I  _ 637 . .1oo  r· · 
I  1 ·  ...  I ·  ·- I.  .···.  .  .. 
I.  . I 
·.  I  ·622  900  I 
I  -I. 
I  206  900  ·  1·· 
]  61  7oo  ]  ·  <. 
.  I  I ·  ·, 
'•  ·>. 
-::· 
. ·.  ~ 
I 
GREECE  I  4  600 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
I  30  400  ·-I  .  •  .. _  .· 
I  I 
7  400  ..  29  400 
I 
EEC  10  I  · I  1  841  400  I .  ·· 
1  I  I 
.  . 
.  '  ...  •  .·· 
~ :.  . 
I 
WESTERN  EUROPE  I  1  ·J 
I  I  1 
I  I 
.•  JAPAN  I  7 389  100  1  6 o4o  ooo  I  4 440  ooo  4 516  200  .  I 
~-R-.E-ST_O_F  -W-OR-L~D-·.  -+1-. ·----.  __ ..-..  :·'"'"'!>'  ......  :  .:--.  :-- .. _  •.•  _~>.;.,..._~------; -.... _- ..•.  -+J--.j._,--~--.~-----··· ----+------:····  .· 
I  OF  WHICH  I  I  . I  .  I 
I  EASTERN  BLOCK  I  1  544  000  I '1  143 '900  . 1 1  414  000  1  360. 000  . l 
I  I  1  1  I 
I  SOUTH  KOREA  -1  2  147  100  I  1  180  900  I  806  500  711  200  I• 
I  I  I  I  I 
I  I 
I  T  0  TAL  14  850.100  11  777  600  10  321  300.  I  9  756  800  I 
I  I 
..  -~  ~  . 
'-;_-:•  ·  .. Annex  2 
..  ,_ 
.  :~. 
'·· 
DEVBLOPMBNT  OF  MERCHANT  SHIP  NBW·BUILDI N.G  BY  RBGI'ON  AND.  J'YPB 
OF  SHIP  ·1978  TO  1985  IN 1. ooo ·.·'coru  .AND .,  ( .  MBRCHAN:T<' :sHARES)  ,  ..... 
.. 
:.r 
" 
7-, 
AWES  Japan  s.-ICOrea  Oth.rall  'l'otal 
.,_  .":;  l· 
frail 1982  -! 
em  ' 
CGT  ' 
a:r  ' 
em  ' 
em.  ' 
'!- ·I 
,_£, 
' ..  .. .. ,  ~~~·: 
Dry Cargo. 1978  2876,0  36,0  3265,3  40,9  183618  23,0  ·.  7978~6- 48,:2"  ._,  ·'···. 
.. 
Ships  1979  2701,4  37,3  2628,5  ·36,3  1906,4  26,3  7236,0. 51,;4. 
incl.  1980  1747,8  33,1  2099,7  39,8  1431,9  27' 1  5279~8  ,4i ,8:  . 
COntainer- 1981  1662,0  39,9  .1)43,7  32,3  1159 t 1  27,·8  4164",8  ·'30~3 . 
ships.  1982  1468,2.  35,5  . 1450,6  35,1  167,3 .  4,0  1219,7  29,5  4138,5'  .. 28,4-.  .·"·  -.:.:  . 
1983  1258,4  28,2  1809,2  40,5  301,6  6,8  1396,6  31,3  .  4464,2  ..  32,9  .. 
1984  1335,1  26,4  2145,2  42,4  542,1 .  10,7  1581 r 7  31,2  5061;9 : 33,0. 
0 
>  ·- '  ~ 
1985  1190,2  26,7  .1~44,0  41,4  521,3  11,7  1423,2  31,9  · 4457,3.  ~~ ,5 
Bulk- 1978  521,3  19,3  1438~5  53,4  '135,9  27,3  2695,·5···,,·6,3·  -· 
., 
Carriers  1979  311,7  22,5  52-7,4  38,1  S46,7  39,5  1385;6 :  ?;8 . 
-~~-
incl.·  1980  197,4  13,3  569;9  38,5  713,6  48,2  1480;8  .. 11,7 
OD:iined  1981  441,8  13,3  1856,1  55,7  1034 ;a  31,0  . 3332,7  24,.2··  ....... 
Carriers  1982  625,6  14,7  2439,9  57,3  473,2  1  1, 1  1196,1  28,1  4261,6  29~2  !-<;_, 
1983'  723,6  21,7  1664,6  49,9  447,1  13,4·  949,5  28,4  3337,7. ·24 ,, 
1984  517,3  9,7  3601 ,o  67,6  249,5  4,7  1207,4  22,7  532!i,7·  34,.7 
1985  358,4  7,2  3145,7  63,0  768,8  15,4  1486,6  29,8  4990,7  35,2  :.  ·:. 
Oil  1978  968,9  45,6  533,3  25,1  .623,4  29,3  2125,7  12,8 . 
Tanker  1979  611, 1  29,8  949,,  46,3  489,4  23,9  2049,5  14,6  ·~- ~-~ 
1980  294,5  14,5  1473,4  7:2,6  260,7  12,8  2029,0  16,1 
1981  470,5  19,2  1519,5  62,0  . 459,6  18,8  2449,6  17,8 
1982  324,6  16,1  1181,8  58,6  100,6  5,0  511,8  25,4  2018,2  "13,8 
1983  532,8  34,8  500,0  32,7  113,2  7,4  496,5  32,5  1529,3  11,3 
1984  97,6  15,9  183,7  30,0 .  170,5  27,8  331,9  S4,2  613,2  . 4,0  ·-.•. 
1985  19,.8  4,1  293,7  60,5 .  66,3  13,7  172,2  35,5  485 •. 7  3,,4 
'···  '• 
Gas/Olem•  1978'  435,6  50,0  73,1  8,4  362,1  41,6  870,7.  s;3 
arid  Prod.  1979  481,8  53,2  180,8  20,0  242,S  26,8  904,9: '  6,4 
Tanlters4l  1980  426,7  47,1.  379,1  41 ,a  100,1  1  1 ,0  ·906,0  . 7,2 
1981  607,2  53,3  426,5  37,4  ·106,4  9,3  1140,1  8,3. 
1982  655,3  !)7 ,1  283,1  24~7  119, 7'. 10,4  208,6  18,2  1147,2·.  7,9 
1983  421 ,'J  39,7  473,2  44,5  42,6  4,0  168,5  15,8  1063,4  7,8 
1984  463,0  '29,0  859,0  !i3, 7  35,7  2,2  276,7  17,3  1598;7  10,4 
198S  523,3  27,1  833,0  43,1  217,0  11,2  577,7  29,9  1933,9  13,6 
··~·  ..  - ' 
Fishi1'13  1978  262,0  26,,  208,5  20,8  534,6  53,2  1004,7  6  t 1 
vessels  1979  180,3  21,6  262,3  31,4  393,1  47,0  835,9  5,9 
1980  213,6  21,6  304,8  30,8  470,1  47,5  988,7  7,8  '  -~ . 
1981  175,1  23,8  179,6  24,4  380,6  51,,8  735,3  5,3 
1982  148,7  18,6  119,6  14,9 .  533,0  66,5  801,3  5,5 
1983  222,3  26,1  126,3  14,8  9,5  1, 1  504,0  59,1  852,6  "6,3 
1984  197,6  22,5  132,4  15,1  6,8  0,8  S47,0  62,4  877,1  5,7, 
..  ,.-
1985  169.7  25,4  145,0  21,7  10,2  1,5  3S4,2  52,9  669,0  4,7 
Other  1978  769,2  41,1  601,7  32,1  501,0  26,8  1872,0  11,3 
JolXV  1979  821,7  49,3  427,5  25,7  416,9  25,0  1666,4.  1.1 ,8 
1980  1051',5  53,9  380,0  19,5  519,0  26,6.  1950,8  15,4 
1981  1162,8  '60,2  270,2  14,0  499,0  25,8  1932,0  J4,0  ::~ 
1982  1062,6  47,8  336,1  15,1  19,6  0,9  8822,3  37,0  222.1,0  15,2  ~  ·.; .  :  •. J 
1983  1217, 1'  .52,8  334,9  14,5  71 ,S  3,1  753,1  32,7  2305,1  .17,0 
1984  800,4  42,8  315,1  16,9  29,4  1,6  754,4  40,3  18§9~9 . '12,2 
1985  827.7  50·, 7  237,1  14,5  49,7  3,0  567,2  34,8  1631,9  1l,5 
'lbtal  1978  5832.,9  35,3  6120,5  37,0  504,6  3,0  4593,3  . 27,8  16546,7  100,0 
1979  5107,9  36,3  4975,2  35,3  449,7  3,2  3994,4  28,4  14077,7  100,0 
.  ,! 
1980  3931 ,a  31,1  5207,2  41,2  445,7  3,5  '3496,3  27,7  12635,2  100,0 
1981  4519,4  32,9  5595,6  40,7  516,0  3,8·  3639,5  26,5  137S4,S  100,0 
1982  4285,0  29,4  5811 t 1  39,8 .  880,4·  6,0  4491,7  30,8  14587,8  100,0 
1983  4375,9  32,3  49()8,2  36,2  985,5·  . 7,3  4268,2  31,5  13552,3  100,0 
1984  3410,9  22,2  i236 ,6  4"1;2  .:  1034,1:>  6,}  •469.9 ,0  30,6  . 15346,5  100,0 
-1985  3088,9  21 ,a  649F1,4''  45,9  ·163).,3.11,5  ,  4SB.r;J  32,3  14168,6  100,0 
Source:  Lloyd's Register of·Shipping, .differences due. to rounding 
11  from  1984  based on nw CCI'  eo<•fficients 
2)  fran 1982  including Greece 
3}  including South-Korea  · 
4)  !ran 1984  including Product  T3nkers  .,.,  ''..r 
~- . 
...... 
. ; 
.  :  ·.~'  ~ 